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Overview
We focus on large games in this thesis, with insight into equilibrium charac-
terization in the first chapter and dominant strategies in the second chapter.
The applications of large games have developed for years. We are still
working on the characterization result to fill the gap between the existence
and symmetrizability results.
In the first chapter, the key result is the characterization of equilibrium
distributions. A distribution is an equilibrium distribution iff for any subset
of actions the number of players favoring an element in this subset is at least
as large as the number of players playing this subset of actions.
We give an elegantly simple proof applying Theorem 5 from Khan-Sun
(1995) to a large game with action set being the countable compact metric
space, to obtain the desired equilibrium characterization result.
We also show the main characterization result holds for the case in which
the agent space is endowed with Lebesgue measure. Through counterexam-
ples, we show that if the action space becomes the general compact metric
space with all the other conditions remain the same, the sufficiency of the
characterization result will fail. And the nonexistence of Nash Equilibria can
vii
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be shown. At the end of this chapter, the characterization result will hold
when the agent space is endowed with Loeb measure instead of Lebesgue
measure.
Incentive compatible allocations are indeed weakly dominant strategies.
In the second chapter, By presenting the established result by Sun-Yannelis
(2007b), it says that when agents become informationally negligible in a large
economy with asymmetric information, every ex ante efficient allocation must
be incentive compatible, which means that any ex ante core or Walrasian
allocation is incentive compatible. The strong independence assumption,
however, is truly strong in the sense that it precludes the interdependence of
signals among individual agents, while in the real world, it is highly possible
for some agents to share a common piece of information about the economy.
This motivates me to lift the ban by allowing a certain degree of information
sharing. In this paper, agents in a cohort–a small group of finite agents–may
have interdependent signals, though such interdependence no longer exists
outside a cohort. Since information sharing is limited, a similar result to that
of Sun and Yannelis (2007b) can be obtained as expected.
The main result here concludes ex ante efficiency implies incentive com-
patibility upon the relaxation of information structure, meaning that ex ante
efficient allocations are weakly dominant strategies under the assumed infor-
mation structure.
The Author’s Contribution
The author gives an elegantly simple proof applying Theorem 5 from Khan-
Sun (1995) to a large game with action set being the countable compact
metric space. The author shows the main characterization result holds for
the case in which the agent space is endowed with Lebesgue measure. She
also shows, through counterexamples, that if the action space becomes the
general compact metric space with all the other conditions remain the same,
the sufficiency of the characterization result will fail.The result will hold if
the agent space is endowed with Loeb measure instead of Lebesgue measure.
The author shows, in the second chapter, the conditional independence
condition on the information structure can be relaxed so that some depen-
dence among the agents’ signals are allowed, and the result that ex ante
efficient allocations are weakly dominant strategies, i.e., incentive compati-
ble, still hold. Conditioned on the true states of nature, the events generated
by the private signals of the agents in the finite cohort have strictly no in-
fluence over the rest of the agents, though the signals for the agents in the






In this chapter, we call a game with a continuum of players and a continuum
of actions a non-atomic game.
A game is called anonymous if players’ preferences only depend on their
own selection and statistical distribution of actions, i.e., players have no
strategic influences on the distribution of actions.
In non-atomic games a pure or mixed action profile induces a distribution
on the set of actions assigning a popularity weight on each action.
An action distribution is called equilibrium distribution if it is induced
by a Nash Equilibrium of the game.
The key result here is the characterization of equilibrium distributions.
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A distribution is an equilibrium distribution iff for any subset of actions the
number of players favoring an element in this subset is at least as large as
the number of players playing this subset of actions.
This chapter starts with an interesting Veiling Problem.
We then give an elegantly simple proof applying Theorem 5 from Khan-
Sun (1995) to a non-atomic anonymous game with action set being the count-
able compact metric space.
The applications of non-atomic anonymous games have developed for
years. We are still working on the characterization result to fill the gap
between the existence and symmetrizability results.
In this thesis, we show the main characterization result holds for the
case in which the agent space is endowed with Lebesgue measure. We also
show, through counterexamples, that if the action space becomes the general
compact metric space with all the other conditions remain the same, the
sufficiency of the characterization result will fail. The nonexistence of Nash
Equilibrium will be shown under Lebesgue setting.
Last but not least, the result will be true if the agent space is endowed
with Loeb measure instead of Lebesgue measure. See the proof from a propo-
sition from Sun, 1996.
1.2 The Veiling Problem
In this subsection, we study the paper written by Blonski, M., The women of
Cairo: Equilibria in large anonymous games, Journal of Mathematical Eco-
3
nomics 41, 253-264 (2005).
We think of Cairo which is a city with a broad spectrum of interacting
religious factions and diverse political backgrounds. It is not clear that how
public expressions of religious affiliation or political opinion will show up and
which possible outcomes we might expect.
We are interested in the proportion of women in Cairo choosing to veil them-
selves and how it can constitute an equilibrium.
In the veiling problem, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, we
are interested in the proportion of women in Cairo choosing to veil them-
selves and how it can constitute an equilibrium.
We approach this problem by formulating a model containing some key fea-
tures. Let a continuum of players I = [0, 1] be an approximation for the
women of Cairo.The women can choose to veil or not to veil, i.e., a binary
decision k ∈ {ν,¬ν}. We categorize the women population into three types:
(1) fundamentalistic with proportion f < 1
2
; (2) secular with proportion
s < 1
2
; (3) opportunistic with the remainder 1− f − s of the population.
Fundamentalists not only want to veil themselves, k = ν. They also pursue
a religious society where everybody is veiled. Secular women on the contrary
prefer not to veil, k = ¬ν, unless they are forced to do so by social pressure.
Opportunistic women have no intrinsic preference and they only follow the
majority as they are susceptible to social pressure.
As we mentioned above that we are interested in predicting x ∈ [0, 1], the
4
proportion of women who choose to veil themselves, and how an equilibrium
x is affected by the diverse types.
It’s necessary to understand the concept of ”social pressure” that we use
here. Assume that a woman can only observe or care about her own deci-
sion k ∈ {ν,¬ν} and the proportion x of veiled women. She cannot see how
this proportion is composed by fundamentalist, opportunistic and secular
women. A further assumption is that only the veiled women of all types are
perceived to exert social pressure to conform. In contrast, non-veiled women
are viewed as being tolerant. Note that we would get the same result if we
would assume conversely that only veiled women perform social pressure, by
symmetry of the preference structure.
Assume that unveiled women suffer a disutility increasing with x. We
give the more precise assumptions by the shape of the utility functions uf ,uo
































































































Fig. 3. Secularists’ Preferences
The solid lines in Figs 1-3 represents the utility functions without social
pressure. The dotted lines represent the utility functions for staying unveiled
and facing social distress. The threshold values a, aˆ and xˆ are the quali-
tative variables with an impact on optimal decisions. Below the thresholds
opportunistic or secular women prefer not to veil themselves.
This example is designed such that we can restrict the analysis to fix-
points of θ(x). Any equilibrium distribution should satisfy the property that
number of women choosing a certain decision should not exceed the number
of women who favor the decision for that distribution. under the present set
of assumptions x = f, x = 1 − s and x = 1 are the only possible candidates
for stable equilibria. At x = a, aˆ, xˆ we may get additional equilibria. The
7
latter equilibria are instable in the sense that any infinitesimal subset of the






































































Fig. 6. θ(x) for high social pressure
9
For any distribution x, let the number (Lebesgue measure λ) of women
that prefer to veil themselves be θ(x), where
θ(x) = λ{i ∈ I|ui(ν, x) ≥ ui(¬ν, x)}
In this example, we can restrict the analysis to fixed-points of θ(x)
Let Γ(I, E, ui) denote a large anonymous game. The unit interval I =
[0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ is a continuum of players. Denote
by |A| := λ(A) the measure of a set A ⊂ I. The common finite action space
is denoted by E = {1, ..., n}. Denote the set of mixed actions by




and the set of measurable mixed action profiles SI = {σ : I → S|σ is measurable}
with σ(i) = (σ1(i), ..., σn(i)) ∈ S.Let σk(i) ∈ [0, 1] be player i’s probability to
choose action k. By measurability σk(i) is a measurable real-valued function
from I to [0, 1]. Denote D as the set of action distributions where each action
distribution assigns a popularity weight to each action.








defined and induces a projection mapping pi : SI → D with










Different pure action profiles inducing the same action distribution are called
mutual permutations, i.e., name φ(α) ∈ EI a permutation of pure profile α
iff φ(α) ∈ EI induces the same distribution pi(φ(α)) = pi(α) as profile α. Let
℘(E) denote the power set of E containing the 2n subsets of E. For any
distribution x let xK :=
∑
k∈K xk be the number of players playing actions
in subset K ∈ ℘(E).
In large anonymous games, players’preferences are given by a function u : I×
E×D → R that is measurable in I. The utility function ui(k, x) ≡ u(i, k, x)
defined on E×D. Anonymity reflects the assumption that players don’t care
or cannot observe who plays what and they only concern about their own





is the expected utility of a mixed action s. Let Bx : I → ℘(E) the pure best
response set of player i containing all weakly preferred pure actions of player
i where
Bx(i) := {k ∈ E|ui(k, x) ≥ ui(l, x)∀l ∈ E} ∈ ℘(E),
the set of players with a best response k to distribution x:
Θx(k) := {i ∈ I|k ∈ Bx(i)} ⊂ I,
The respective number of players with a best response k to distribution x:
θx(k) := |Θx(k)|,
A family of sets in I with index set E:
Θx = (Θx(k))k∈E,
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Define accordingly the set and the number of players with a best response in
subset K by
Θx(K) := ∪k∈KΘx(k) = {i ∈ I|K ∩Bx(i) 6= ∅},
θx(K) := |Θx(K)|.
Notice that θx(K) ≤
∑
k∈K θx(k) since players with more than one best
response in K are countered only once in Θx(K). We still need the definition
of equilibria: For each mixed action profile σ ∈ SI define the support of
player i’s chosen mixture to be:
Kσ : I → ℘(E)
where
Kσ(i) := Supp(σ(i)) = {k ∈ E|σk(i) > 0} ∈ ℘(E)
Let D(σ) be the set of dissatisfied players:
D(σ) = {i ∈ I|Kσ(i) * Bpi(σ)(i)}
and the number,d(σ), of dissatisfied players of action profile σ
d(σ) = |D(σ)|
Note that (1) σ∗ ∈ SI is a Nash equilibrium iff d(σ) = 0. (2) x∗ is an
equilibrium distribution if there exists a Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ pi−1(x∗) with
induced distribution x∗.
Lemma 1.2.1 In a large anonymous game Γ(I, E, ui) each equilibrium dis-
tribution x∗ is induced by a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: Let σ∗ with pi(σ∗) = x∗ be a mixed equilibrium profile inducing
x∗. Consider the family of subsets
IK(σ
∗) := K−1σ (K) = {i ∈ I|Kσ∗(i) = K}
of I. All players within IK(σ
∗) mix over the same support K. IK(σ∗) is
a partition over I meaning that each player i belongs to exactly one such
subset,i.e.,IK(σ
∗) ∩ IL(σ∗) = ∅ for K 6= L and ∪K∈℘(E)IK(σ∗) = I.
Claim: σ∗ is an equilibrium implies that there exists a pure strategy equilib-
rium α∗ ∈ pi−1(x∗) ∩ EI .
Measurability of σ∗ implies that the mixtures of the players in IK(σ∗)








Partition the set IK(σ





σ∗k(i)dλ. choose any such partition for each K ∈ ℘(E),
let the set of subsets of E containing element k be:
Ek = {K ∈ ℘(E)|k ∈ K} ⊂ ℘(E)
Define another partition Jk of I by
Jk = ∪L∈EkIL,k(σ∗).
Consider the pure strategy α∗ with α∗(i) = k for i ∈ Jk. Since σ∗ was an
equilibrium, the best response sets of almost all players i ∈ IL,k(σ∗) contain
the set L, i.e.,L ⊂ Bx∗(i). Changing their strategies from mixtures over L to
the pure strategy k ∈ L ⊂ Bx∗(i) guarantees that almost all players still play
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best responses to the distribution x∗. Moreover, this construction didn’t alter
the distribution, i.e., α induces x∗ or pi(α∗k) = x
∗

























∗)) + 0 = λ(Jk) = pi(α∗k).¥
Theorem 1.2.2 In a large anonymous game Γ(I, E, ui) distribution x
∗ is an
equilibrium distribution if and only if for no subset K of actions the number
x∗K of players playing actions K exceeds the number θx∗(K) of players with
a best response in K,i.e.,
x∗is equilibrium distribution⇔ θx∗(K) ≥ x∗K∀K ⊂ E.
For the proof, we need the theorem of Bollobas-Veropoulos (1974).
Λ-Representation
Definition 1.2.1 Let Λ = (λk)k∈E be a family of numbers λk ∈ [0, 1] with
index set E. The family Z = (Z(k))k∈E of measurable sets Z(k) ⊂ I is called
Λ-representable if there is a family X = (X(k))k∈E of measurable subsets
X(k) ⊂ I all with the same index set E such that for all k, l ∈ E with k 6= l
one has
(i) X(k) ⊂ Z(k)
(ii) |X(k)| = λk
(iii)|X(k) ∩X(l)| = 0.
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Bollobas and Varopoulos, 1974
Theorem 1.2.3 Z is Λ-representable if and only if
∣∣∣ ∪k∈K Z(k)∣∣∣ ≥∑
k∈K
λk∀K ⊂ E
For a proof, see Bollobas and Varopoulos (1974).
Proof of Theorem 1.2.2.
⇒: Consider a distribution x ∈ D with θx(K) < xK for some K ⊂ E. This
means that for distribution x the number of players playing actions in K
exceeds the number of players with a best response in K. Hence, x cannot
be induced by a pure strategy equilibrium. Together with Lemma 1.2.1 this
implies that x is not an equilibrium distribution.
⇐: Apply Theorem 1.2.2 to the family Θ = (Θx∗(k))k∈E of measurable
subsets of I and the family of numbers Λ = (x∗k)k∈E. Both with index set E.
To prove sufficiency, we can use θx∗(K) ≥ x∗K∀K ⊂ E or∣∣∣ ⋃
k∈K
Θx∗(k)
∣∣∣ = θx∗(K) ≥ x∗K =∑
k∈K
x∗k.
The theorem of Bollobas-Varopoulos (1974) implies that Θ is Λ-representable.
Hence, by definition of Λ-representability there exists a family of subsets X,
denoted by (α∗−1(k))k∈E such that
(i) α∗−1(k) ⊂ Θx∗(k) for all k ∈ E,
(ii)|α∗−1(k)| = x∗k,
(iii)|α∗−1(k) ∩ α∗−1(l)| = 0 for k 6= l.
(ii) and (iii) imply pi(α∗) = x∗ and (i) implies that the so defined action
15
profile α∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. All together shows that x∗ =
pi(α∗) is an equilibrium distribution which completes the proof.¥
1.3 Notations
In this chapter, we use the symbols (I, I, λ) for an atomless probability space,
where I denotes the agent space endowed with the probability measure λ.
Let the space of actions A be a compact metric space and M(A) be the
set of all Borel probability measures on A. Denote by C(A ×M(A)) the
space of continuous real-valued functions on A ×M(A). Then our game is
a measurable mapping Γ from I to C(A ×M(A)). Given agent i’s action
a ∈ A and probability measure ν ∈M(A), her payoff is ui(a, ν) = Γ(i)(a, ν).
Let F be a measurable correspondence from I to A ,where F is said to
be measurable if for each closed subset C of A, the set F−1(C) = {i ∈
I : F (i) ∩ C 6= ∅} is measurable in I. An action profile f , which is a
measurable selection of F , is a measurable mapping from I to A in the sense
that f−1(B) ∈ I for all the Borel sets B in A. The induced probability
measure λf−1 on A is defined as (λf−1)(B) = λ(f−1(B)) for any Borel set
B in A.
Now we turn to the definition of an equilibrium of the game Γ. Bν(i) =
{a ∈ A|ui(a, v) ≥ ui(b, v) for all b ∈ A} is set of best responses for player
i, aware of the distribution ν ∈ M(A). By the compactness of A, Bν(i) is
non-empty for every agent i. Hence Bν defines a measurable correspondence
16
from I to A. Bν is also closed-valued. For any i, by definition, Bν(i) = {a ∈
A : ui(a, ν) ≥ ui(b, ν) for all b ∈ A}.
Let an ∈ Bν and an → a. Hence for any b ∈ A, ui(an, ν) ≥ ui(b, ν).
By the continuity of ui, we have ui(a, ν) = limn→∞ ui(an, b). This implies
ui(a, ν) ≥ ui(b, ν). Hence a ∈ Bν . Bν is closed.
By Theorem 17.18 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)(p.570), a distribution
ν inM(A) is called an equilibrium distribution if we can find an action profile
f such that
1. f(i) ∈ Bν(i) for λ-almost all i; and
2. λf−1 = ν.
1.4 Existence and Characterization of Equi-
librium In Spaces With Countable Ac-
tions
1.4.1 Existence of equilibrium
Fixed-point theorems for correspondences have provided the standard tool
for showing the existence of economic equilibria in many areas of economics.
Before the the characterization of equilibria, we will first give a theorem which
shows the existence. The following theorem is a special case of Theorem 10
(Khan-Sun (1995)).
Theorem 1.4.1 There exists a Nash Equilibrium for the large game Γ with
17
countable actions.
1.4.2 Characterization of equilibrium in spaces with
countable actions
We generalize finite action space (which Blonski’s work ”The women of
Cairo” conditioned on) to countable compact space with agent space en-
dowed with Lebesgue measure. We give a proof based on Khan-Sun(1995) ’s
work.
Theorem 1.4.2 In a large anonymous game Γ, suppose that action space
A is a countable compact metric space and agent space I is endowed with
Lebesgue measure λ, then ν ∈ M(A) is an equilibrium distribution if and
only if for any finite subset C of actions the number λ(B−1ν (C)) of players
with a best response in C is no less than the number ν(C)of players playing
actions C, i.e.,
ν ∈M(A) is an equilibrium distribution iff all finite subset C of A, λ(B−1ν (C)) ≥
ν(C).
The proof will be quite straightforward when we use the basic selection
theorem (Khan-Sun, 1995).
Theorem 1.4.3 (Khan-Sun, 1995)
If F is measurable and τ ∈M(A), then τ ∈ DF if and only if for all finite
B ⊆ A, λ(F−1(B)) ≥ τ(B).
Where DF = {λf−1 : f is a measurable selection of F}
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Proof: If τ ∈ DF , then there is a measurable selection f of F such that
λf−1 = τ . Thus for any finite B ⊆ A,
τ(B) = λ(f−1(B)) = λ({t ∈ T : f(t) ∈ B})
≤ λ({t ∈ T : F (t) ∩B 6= ∅}).










i∈I τi, and we can apply the Theorem 4, Khan-
Sun(1995), to assert that there exist, for all i ∈ N, Si ⊆ Ti, λ(Si) = τi, Si ∩
Sj = ∅ for all j 6= i.
Now define a measurable function f : T ⇒ A such that for all i ∈ N and
for all t ∈ Si, f(t) = ai. Since, for any
i ∈ N, t ∈ Si ⇒ ai ∈ F (t)⇒ f(t) ∈ F (t),
and that furthermore,




f is the required selection.¥
Proof of Theorem 1.4.2
Define DBν = {λf−1 : f is a measurable selection of Bν}.
(=⇒) Let ν ∈ M(A) be an equilibrium. By definition, ν = λf−1 for
some action profile f with f(i) ∈ Bν(i) for λ-almost all i. Note that f is a
measurable selection of Bν , ν ∈ DBν . By Theorem 1.4.3, ν ∈ DBν implies
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λ(B−1ν (C)) ≥ ν(C) for any finite subset C of A. In other words, if ν is an
equilibrium, then λ(B−1ν (C)) ≥ ν(C) for any finite subset C of A.
(⇐=) Let ν be a distribution in M(A) such that λ(B−1ν (C)) ≥ ν(C) for
any finite subset C of A. By Theorem 1.4.3, ν ∈ DBν . That is, ν = λf−1
for some measurable selection f of Bν . Hence f(i) ∈ Bν(i) for λ-almost all
i ∈ I. v is thus an equilibrium. This completes the proof.¥
We proved the key result of this chapter–the characterization of equilib-
rium distributions, to the extent of the countable compact metric space. A
distribution is an equilibrium distribution iff for any finite subset of actions
the number of players favoring an element in this subset is at least as large
as the number of players playing this subset of actions.
As we are able to establish the results to countable compact action space,
next, we also see that it’s not the case with regard to the general compact
action space, through a counterexample. And we will also show the nonexis-
tence of Nash Equilibrium in Lebesgue setting.
1.5 Counterexamples
1.5.1 The failure of characterization result
The purpose of this subsection is to show that when the action space A in
Theorem 1.4.2 is replaced by a general compact metric action space, the
20
sufficiency can fail.
Now consider a game Γ in which the space of players is the Lebesgue unit
interval I = [0, 1], and the action set A is the interval [-1,1]. Here we consider
the uniform distribution on [-1,1], denoted by ν∗.
Let player i’s payoff function be ui(a, ν
∗) = −|i− |a||
Then it is obvious that the best response set for player i is:
Bν∗(i) = {a ∈ A|ui(a, ν∗) ≥ ui(b, ν∗) ∀ b ∈ A}= {i, -i}
Let C be any Borel set in A,
C = C1
⋃
C2 , where C1 ⊂ (0, 1] and C2 ⊂ [−1, 0].Then
λ(B−1ν∗ (i)) = λ({i ∈ I | C
⋂
Bν∗(i) 6= ∅})













Hence λ(B−1ν∗ (i)) ≥ λ(C1)+λ(C2)2 = ν∗(C).
Next, we prove that ν∗ cannot be an equilibrium distribution,
i.e., there is no such f being a measurable selection of Bν∗(i),
s.t. λf−1 = ν∗ and f(i) ∈ Bν∗(i) for almost all i ∈ I.
Suppose ν∗ is an equilibrium distribution,
21
by definition f(i) ∈ Bν∗(i) , then there exists A ⊆ (0, 1] , such that
f(i) =
 i i ∈ A−i i /∈ A
Hence, λ(A) = λf−1(A) = ν∗(A) = λ(A)
2
.
This is a contradiction.¥
We conclude that the characterization result does not hold for the general
compact metric action space, though it’s valid for the stronger condition–
countable compact metric space, where the agent space is endowed with
Lebesgue measure in both cases.
1.5.2 Nonexistence of Nash equilibria in the Lebesgue
setting
The above counterexample shows that one cannot obtain some desired regu-
larity properties for distributions of correspondences on Lebesgue probability
space. Next, the nonexistence of Nash Equilibrium under Lebesgue setting
can be shown.
Consider a game Γ1 in which the space of player names is the unit interval
T = [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure λ, and the action set A is the interval
[−1, 1]. Define the payoff function Γ1t of any player t ∈ [0, 1] to be given by
Γ1t (a, ν) = h(a, ν)− |t− |a||,
22




a/2 for 0 ≤ a ≤ (`/2);
(`− a)/2 for (`/2) ≤ a ≤ `;
−g(a− `, `) for ` ≤ a ≤ 2`
where h(a, ν) = g(a, βδ(ν, τ ∗)), β is a number in the open interval (0, 1)
and δ(ν, τ ∗) is the distance between ν and the uniform probability measure
τ ∗ on [−1, 1] under the Prohorov metric. The Prohorov metric is defined
here from the natural metric |x − y| on underlying space [−1, 1]. It is clear
that δ(ν, τ ∗) ≤ 1.
Theorem 1.5.1 The game Γ1 has no Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium f for the game Γ1. Let
ν0 be λf
−1, the distribution on [−1, 1] induced by f . If ν0 is the uniform
distribution τ ∗ on [−1, 1], then δ(ν0, τ ∗) = 0. Thus, for a ∈ [−1, 1] , h(a, ν0) =
0 , and hence Γ1t (a, ν0) = −|t − |a||. This means that the best response for
player t is to choose t or −t. Therefore, the equilibrium f must be a selection
of the correspondence F in the above example whose distribution is τ ∗. This
is a contradiction.
Thus, we must have 0 < δ(ν0, τ
∗) ≤ 1. Denote βδ(ν0, τ ∗) by `0. Consider
the case t ∈ ((k − 1)`0, k`0) for an odd positive integer k. This means that
g(t, `0) > 0. Note that the payoff for player t is
Γ1t (a, ν0) = h(a, ν0)− |t− |a|| = g(a, `0)− |t− |a||.
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By the fact that g(·, `) is Lipschitz continuous of modulus 1/2, we can obtain
that for each a in the interval [0, 1]− {t},
Γ1t (a, ν0)− Γ1t (t, ν0) = g(a, `0)− g(t, `0)− |t− |a|| ≤ −|t− a|/2 < 0. (1.5.1)
Next take a ∈ [−1, 0). If g(a, `0) ≤ 0, then the fact that −g(t, `0) < 0 and
−|t − |a|| ≤ 0 implies that g(a, `0) − g(t, `0) − |t − |a|| < 0. If g(a, `0) > 0,
then g(|a|, `0) = −g(a, `0) < 0. Thus there is a number c between t and |a|
such that g(c, `0) = 0, and hence
g(a, `0)− g(t, `0) = −g(|a|, `0)− g(t, `0)
= g(c, `0)− g(|a|, `0) + g(c, `0)− g(t, `0)
≤ ||a| − c| /2 + |c− t| /2 < |t− |a||.
Therefore, we can conclude that Γ1t (a, ν0) < Γ
1
t (t, ν0) for any a ∈ [−1, 1] with
a 6= t. This means that the unique optimal action for player t is t. Since f
is a Nash equilibrium, f(t) must be an optimal action for player t. Hence,
f(t) = t. A similar argument shows that f(t) = −t when t ∈ ((k− 1)`0, k`0)
for an even positive integer k. Thus we obtain that f(t) = (−1)k−1t for
t 6= m`0,m ∈ N.
It is clear that the support S of ν0 oscillates between intervals of length
`0, moving outwards from the origin in both directions, and on the support,
ν0 is the same as the Lebesgue measure. We shall show that the Prohorov
distance δ(ν0, τ
∗) is at most `0. In particular, we check that for any Borel
set E in [−1, 1], ν0(E) ≤ τ ∗(B(E, ²) + ² for any ² > `0. Without loss of
generality, assume E to be a Borel subset of S which does not contain any
endpoints of the subintervals in S. List the subintervals in S as S1, S2, · · · , Sm
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in an increasing order, with S1 or Sm possibly of length less than `0. Let
Ei = E
⋂
Si. Then Ei + `0 is a subset of the open subinterval with length
`0 on right of Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 (note that Sm may not be followed by a
subinterval of length `0). It is clear that all the Ei, Ei+ `0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
are disjoint and also their union is a subset of B(E, ²). Since τ(Em) ≤ `0











(τ ∗(Ei) + τ ∗(Ei + `0)) + `0 ≤ τ ∗ (B(E, ²)) + ².
Hence δ(ν0, τ
∗) ≤ `0.
Finally, we recall the definition of `0 = βδ(ν0, τ
∗). Thus δ(ν0, τ ∗) ≤
βδ(ν0, τ
∗), which implies β ≥ 1. This contradicts the original choice of β in
the open interval (0, 1). Therefore the game Γ1 has no Nash equilibrium. ¥
If the agent space is measured using Loeb measure instead of Lebesgue
measure, the characterization result could be established under the weaker
condition that the action space is the general compact metric space.
1.6 Agent Space Endowed With Loeb Mea-
sure
In this section, we will consider the case when the agent space I is en-
dowed with Loeb measure λ, we will see the characterization result can still
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be achieved. The result can be easily obtained using the following lemma
(Sun,1996):
Lemma 1.6.1 Let F be a closed valued measurable correspondence from
atomless Loeb probability space (Ω, L(A), L(P )) to a Polish space X. Let µ
be Borel probability measure on X. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) there is a measurable selection f of F such that L(P )f−1 = µ ;
(ii) for every Borel set A in X, µ(A) ≤ L(P )(F−1(A)) ;
(iii) for every closed set B in X, µ(B) ≤ L(P )(F−1(B)) ;
(iv) for every open set O in X, µ(O) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
Proof: For (i)⇒ (ii), let f be a Loeb measurable function from Ω to X
such that f(ω) ∈ F (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Let A be a Borel set in X. Then for
any ω ∈ f−1(A), f(ω) ∈ A ∩ F (ω), which implies that A ∩ F (ω) 6= ∅. Thus
f−1(A) ⊆ F−1(A), and hence
µ(A) = L(P )(f−1(A)) ≤ L(P )(F−1(A)).
It is clear that (ii) ⇒ (iii).
To prove (iii) ⇒ (iv), let O be an open set in X. Then there is an




each n, we have F−1(Bn) ⊆ F−1(O), which implies that
µ(Bn) ≤ L(P )(F−1(Bn)) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
Hence
µ(O) ≤ L(P )(F−1(O)).
26
It remains to show (iv) ⇒ (i). Let d be a metric on the Polish space
X. For an x ∈ X and a r ∈ R+, let B(x, r) = {y : d(y, x) < r} and
S(x, r) = {y : d(y, x) = r}. We shall first fix an n ≥ 1. Then there
is a compact set Cn in X such that µ(Cn) > 1 − 1/n. For every point
x in Cn, choose 0 < rx < 1/n such that the sphere S(x, rx) is a µ-null
set. There are finitely many points x1, x2, ..., xhn in Cn such that the open
balls B(x1, rx1), ..., B(xhn , rxhn ) cover Cn. Denote rxi = ri for each i. Let
An0 = X −
hn∪
i=1
B(xi, ri) and A
n
k = B(xk, rk) −
k−1∪
i=1
B(xi, ri) for 1 ≤ k ≤ hn.
Then for each fixed n ≥ 1, the Ani ’s form a partition of X. It is clear that
for each 0 ≤ k ≤ hn, Ank is a µ-continuous set. Note that for a µ-continuous
set A with interior B,
L(P )(F−1(A)) ≥ L(P )(F−1(B)) ≥ µ(B) ≥ µ(A)− µ(∂A) = µ(A)
Let Ωni = F
−1(Ani ) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ hn. Since for any finite set I ⊆
{0, 1, ..., hn}, the set ∪
i∈I
Ani is still µ-continuous, we have
L(P )( ∪
i∈I
Ωni ) = L(P )(F
−1( ∪
i∈I






Hence there exists a partition {Sni }hni=0 of Ω such that Sni ⊆ Ωni and L(P )(Sni ) =
µ(Ani ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ hn. Let Fi be a correspondence on the measurable space
(Sni , L(A) ∩ Sni ) defined by Fi(ω) = F (ω) ∩ Ani . Then the graph of Fi is
the intersection of the graph of F with Sni ×Ani , which is measurable in the
product σ-algebra (L(A) ∩ Sni )⊗ B(Ani ).
Since Ani is still a Polish space, it follows that there exists a measurable
selection ϕi of Fi. Define fn on Ω such that fn(ω) = ϕi(ω) for ω ∈ Sni .
Let µn = L(P ) f
−1
n . For any given Borel set A in X, let J = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤
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hn, A ∩ Ani 6= ∅}. Then we have
µn(A) = µn(A ∩ An0 ) + µn( ∪
i∈J
A ∩ Ani )






















Since µ(An0 ) < 1/n and ∪
i∈J
Ani ⊆ B(A, 1/n) = {y ∈ X : ∃x ∈ A, d(x, y) <
1/n}, we have
µn(A) < 1/n+ µ(B(A, 1/n)).
Hence by a definition of the Prohorov metric δ on M(X) , we can conclude
that δ(µn, µ) ≤ 1/n. Thus {µn}∞n=1 converges weakly to µ on X. Since for
each n ≥ 1, fn is also a measurable selection of F , we have µn ∈ DF . By
Theorem 7, µ ∈ DF , and so we are done.¥
We present our characterization results with Loeb measure as follows:
Theorem 1.6.2 Let Γ(I, A, ui) denote a large anonymous game. The agent
space I endowed with Loeb measure is a continuum of players. The action
space A is a compact metric space. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(1) ν is an equilibrium distribution.
(2) for every Borel set C in A, λ(B−1ν (C)) ≥ ν(C).
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(3) for every closed set F in A, λ(B−1ν (F )) ≥ ν(F ).
(4) for every open set O in A, λ(B−1ν (O)) ≥ ν(O).
The proof is the same as the proof to Lemma 1.6.1.
When the action space is relaxed to, but not limited to (e.g. open sets),
the general compact space, the characterization result can still be achieved
if the agent space has been measured under Loeb measure, i.e., the following
two results are equivalent:
a) For any subset of actions, the number of players playing this subset
of actions is no more than the number of players favoring an element in this
subset;
b) The induced distribution is an equilibrium distribution.
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Chapter 2
Ex Ante Efficiency Implies
Incentive Compatibility
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that in a finite-agent economy with asymmetric information,
there may not exist any incentive compatible, efficient allocations. However,
intuition suggests that a perfectly competitive market should still perform
efficiently since no single agent has monopoly power on information. This
intuitive idea of perfect competition for an atomless economy with asymmet-
ric information is formalized in Sun and Yannelis (2007b), which shows that
every ex ante efficient allocation is incentive compatible. The proof of this
result requires four main assumptions, namely, strong conditional indepen-
dence on the information structure, strict concavity on the utility functions,
type independence on the utility functions and endowments.
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The strong independence assumption, however, is truly strong in the sense
that it precludes the interdependence of signals among individual agents,
while in the real world, it is highly possible for some agents to share a com-
mon piece of information about the economy. This motivates me to lift the
ban by allowing a certain degree of information sharing. In this paper, agents
in a cohort–a small group of finite agents–may have interdependent signals,
though such interdependence no longer exists outside a cohort. Since infor-
mation sharing is limited, a similar result to that of Sun and Yannelis (2007b)
can be obtained as expected.
In the latter part of this chapter, we will see the conditional indepen-
dence condition on the information structure can be relaxed so that some
dependence among the agents’ signals are allowed. Conditioned on the true
states of nature, the events generated by the private signals of the agents in
the finite cohort have strictly no influence over the rest of the agents, though
the signals for the agents in the same cohort may have correlations. The
corresponding proof forms the main result of this chapter.
2.2 Fubini Extension and The Exact Law of
Large Numbers
In order to work with independent processes constructed from signal profiles,
we need to work with an extension of the usual measure-theoretic product
that retains the Fubini property. Below is a formal definition of the Fubini
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extension in Definition 2.2 of Sun (2006).
Definition 2.2.1 A probability space (I×Ω,W , Q) extending the usual prod-
uct space (I×Ω, I ⊗F , λ⊗P ) is said to be a Fubini extension of (I×Ω, I ⊗
F , λ⊗ P ) if for any real-valued Q-integrable function f on (I × Ω,W),
(1) the two functions fi and fω are integrable respectively on (Ω,F , P )

























To reflect the fact that the probability space (I × Ω,W , Q) has (I, I, λ)
and (Ω,F , P ) as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it
will be denoted by (I × Ω, I £ F , λ£ P ).
We shall now follow the notation of Section 2.3. When the probability
space (I ×T, I£T , λ£P Ts ) is a Fubini extension of the usual product space
(I × T, I ⊗ T , λ ⊗ P Ts ), for each s ∈ S, it can be checked that (I × Ω, I £
F , λ£P ), defined in the last paragraph of Section 2.3, is a Fubini extension
of the usual product space (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ).
The following is an exact law of large numbers for a continuum of inde-
pendent random variables shown in Sun (2006), which is stated here as a
lemma using our notation for the convenience of the reader.2
1The classical Fubini Theorem is only stated for the usual product measure spaces. It
does not apply to integrable functions on (I × Ω,W, Q) since these functions may not be
I ⊗F-measurable. However, the conclusions of that theorem do hold for processes on the
enriched product space (I × Ω,W, Q) that extends the usual product.
2See Corollaries 2.9 and 2.10 in Sun (2006). We state the result using a complete
separable metric space X for the sake of generality. In particular, a finite space or an
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Lemma 2.2.1 If a I £ T -measurable process G from I × T to a complete
separable metric space X is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜
in the sense that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the random variables Gi and Gj from
(T, T , P Ts ) to X are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I, then for each s ∈ S,
the cross-sectional distribution λG−1t of the sample function Gt(·) = G(t, ·)
is the same as the distribution (λ £ P Ts )G−1 of the process G viewed as a
random variable on (I × T, I £ T , λ £ P Ts ) for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T . In






I×T Gd(λ£ P Ts ) holds for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T .
2.3 Ex Ante Efficiency Implies Incentive Com-
patibility Under Strong Independence
2.3.1 Information structure
We fix an atomless probability space3 (I, I, λ) representing the space of eco-
nomic agents, and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK} the space of true states of na-
ture (its power set denoted by S), which are not known to the agents. Let
T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL} be the space of all the possible signals (types) for in-
dividual agents, (T, T ) a measurable space that models the private signal
profiles for all the agents, and therefore T is a space of functions from I to
Euclidean space is a complete separable metric space.
3We use the convention that all probability spaces are countably additive.
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T 0.4 Thus, t ∈ T , as a function from I to T 0, represents a private signal
profile for all agents in I. For agent i ∈ I, t(i) (also denoted by ti) is the
private signal of agent i while t−i the restriction of the signal profile t to
the set I \ {i} of agents different from i; let T−i be the set of all such t−i.
For simplicity, we shall assume that (T, T ) has a product structure so that
T is a product of T−i and T 0, while T is the product algebra of the power
set T 0 on T 0 with a σ-algebra T−i on T−i. For t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0, we shall
adopt the usual notation (t−i, t′i) to denote the signal profile whose value is
t′i for agent i, and the same as t for other agents.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space representing all the uncertainty on
the true states as well as on the signals for all the agents, where (Ω,F) is the
product measurable space (S × T,S ⊗ T ). Let P S and P T be the marginal
probability measures of P respectively on (S,S) and on (T, T ). Let s˜ and
t˜i, i ∈ I be the respective projection mappings from Ω to S and from Ω to
T 0 with t˜i(s, t) = ti.
5 For each true state s ∈ S, we assume without loss of
generality that the state is non-redundant in the sense that pis = P
S({s}) >
0; let P Ts be the conditional probability measure on (T, T ) when the random
variable s˜ takes value s. Thus, for each B ∈ T , P Ts (B) = P ({s} × B)/pis.




s . Note that the conditional probability
4In the literature, one usually assumes that different agents have possibly different sets
of signals and require that the agents take all their own signals with positive probability.
For notational simplicity, we choose to work with a common set T 0 of signals, but allow
zero probability for some of the redundant signals. There is no loss of generality in this
latter approach.
5t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T 0.
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measure P Ts is often denoted as P (·|s) in the literature.
For i ∈ I, let τi be the signal distribution of agent i on the space T 0,6 and
P S×T−i(·|ti) the conditional probability measure on the product measurable
space (S×T−i,S ⊗T−i) when the signal of agent i is ti ∈ T 0. If τi({ti}) > 0,
then it is clear that for D ∈ S ⊗ T−i, P S×T−i(D|ti) = P (D × {ti})/τi({ti}).
For s ∈ S, let P T−is and τis be the marginal probability measures of P Ts
respectively on (T−i, T−i) and (T 0, T 0). Since redundant signals are allowed
for agent i ∈ I (q ∈ T 0 is a redundant signal for agent i if τi({q}) = 0),
we shall impose the assumption that for any q ∈ T 0, if τi({q}) > 0, then
τis({q}) > 0 for all s ∈ S, which means that any non-redundant signal has
positive probability conditioned on any given true state.
Let F be the private signal process from I×T to T 0 such that F (i, t) = ti
for any (i, t) ∈ I×T . In this paper, we need to work with F that is indepen-
dent conditioned on the true states s ∈ S. However, an immediate technical
difficulty arises, which is the so-called measurability problem of independent
processes. In our context, a signal process that is essentially independent,
conditioned on the true states of nature is never jointly measurable in the
usual sense except for trivial cases.7 Hence, we need to work with a joint
agent-probability space (I×T, I£T , λ£P Ts ) that extends the usual measure-
theoretic product (I × T, I ⊗ T , λ⊗P Ts ) of the agent space (I, I, λ) and the
probability space (T, T , P Ts ), and retains the Fubini property.8 Its formal
6For q ∈ T 0, τi({q}) is the probability P (t˜i = q).
7See Sun (2006) and Sun and Yannelis (2007a), and their references for detailed dis-
cussion of the measurability problem.
8I£T is a σ-algebra that contains the usual product σ-algebra I⊗T , and the restriction
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definition is given in Definition 2.2.1.
Let I £ F be the collection of all subsets A of I × Ω such that there are
sets As ∈ I £ T for s ∈ S such that A = ∪s∈S{(i, s, t) ∈ I × Ω : (i, t) ∈ As}.
By abusing the notation, we can denote I£F by (I£T )⊗S. Define λ£P
on I £ F by letting λ£ P (A) =∑s∈S pis(λ£ P Ts )(As). Thus, one can view
λ£ P Ts as the conditional probability measure on I × T , given s˜ = s.
We shall assume that F is a measurable process from (I × T, I £ T ) to
T 0. When the true state is s, the signal distribution of agent i conditioned on
the true state is P Ts F
−1
i , i.e., the probability for agent i to have q ∈ T 0 as her
signal is P Ts (F
−1
i ({q})), where Fi = F (i, ·). Let µs be the agents’ average











1{q}(F (i, t))dP Ts dλ, (2.3.1)
where 1{q} is the indicator function of the singleton set {q}. We shall impose
the following non-triviality assumption on the process F :
∀s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′ ⇒ µs 6= µs′ .
This says that different true states of nature correspond to different average
conditional distributions of agents’ signals.
We shall now follow the definition and notation in Section 2.3. We con-
sider a large economy with asymmetric information. The space of agents
is the atomless probability space (I, I, λ). In this economy, agents i ∈ I are
informed with their private signals ti ∈ T 0 but not the true state, and
they can have contingent consumptions based on the signal profiles t ∈ T
of the countably additive probability measure λ£ PTs to I ⊗ T is λ⊗ PTs .
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announced by all the agents. Decisions are made at the ex ante level. The
common consumption set is the positive orthant Rm+ . In the sequel, we
shall state several assumptions on the economy.
A1. The utility function of each agent depends on her consumption x ∈
Rm+ and the true state s ∈ S but not on the private signals of the agents in
the economy. Thus, we can let u be a function from I ×Rm+ × S to R+ such
that for any given i ∈ I, u(i, x, s) is the utility of agent i at consumption
bundle x ∈ Rm+ and true state s ∈ S.
A2. For any given s ∈ S, u(i, x, s), (also denoted by us(i, x)),9 is I-
measurable in i ∈ I, continuous, strictly concave and monotonic10 in x ∈
Rm+ .
A3. Let e be a λ-integrable function from I to Rm+ with e(i) as the initial
endowment of agent i.11
A4. The private signal process F is a measurable process from (I×T, I£
T ) to T 0 that is strongly conditionally independent, given s˜ in the sense
that for any i ∈ I, agent i’s signal F (i, ·) is independent of all the events in
the signal space (T−i, T−i), conditioned on the true states of nature.12 In
9In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that
is viewed as a parameter in a particular context.
10The utility function u(i, ·, s) is monotonic if for any x, y ∈ Rm+ with x ≤ y and x 6= y,
u(i, x, s) < u(i, y, s).
11Since the true state s ∈ S is not known to the agents, the agents’ endowments cannot
depend on s. However, as in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and Sun and Yannelis (2007a),
here we also assume that the endowments do not depend on the private signals of agents.
12For a general justification of using conditional independence, see Hammond and Sun
(2003).
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other words, for each s ∈ S, the probability space (T, T , P Ts ) is the product
of its marginal probability spaces (T−i, T−i, P T−is ) and (T 0, T 0, τis).
The assumption A4 says that conditioned on the true states of nature,
the private signal of an individual agent has strictly no influence over any
others. Thus, perfect competition prevails in this economy in the sense that
agents have negligible initial endowments and negligible private information.
We shall now consider an economy where the agents are informed with
their signals but not the true state. Formally, the collection Ep = {(I×Ω, I£
F , λ£ P ), u, e, F, s˜} is called a Private Information Economy.
The space of consumption plans for the economy Ep is the space L1(P T ,Rm+ )
of integrable functions from (T, T , P T ) to Rm+ , which is infinite dimensional.




u(i, z(t), s)dP (2.3.2)
be the ex ante expected utility of agent i for the consumption plan z.13
1. An allocation for the economy Ep is an integrable function xp from
(I × T, I £ T , λ £ P T ) to Rm+ ; agent i’s consumption plan is xp(i, ·)
(also denoted by xpi ).





13Fix i ∈ I. Since u(i, ·, s) is strictly concave for each s ∈ S, there are constants c, d ∈ R+
such that u(i, x, s) ≤ c‖x‖ + d for any x ∈ Rm+ , where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm. From
this condition, it is clear that
∫
Ω
u(i, z(t), s)dP is finite.
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3. A feasible allocation xp is said to be ex ante efficient if there does not




4. A feasible allocation xp is said to be ex post efficient if for P T -almost
all t ∈ T , xpt is efficient in the large deterministic (ex post) economy




is the ex post utility of agent i (also denoted by Ui(x|t)) for her con-
sumption bundle x ∈ Rm+ with the given signal profile t.














be the interim expected utility of agent i when she receives private
signal ti but mis-reports as t
′
i. The allocation x
p is said to be incentive
compatible if λ-almost all i ∈ I,
Ui(x
p
i , ti|ti) ≥ Ui(xpi , t′i|ti)
holds for all the non-redundant signals ti, t
′
i ∈ T 0 of agent i (i.e.,
τi({ti}) > 0 and τi({t′i}) > 0).
6. A feasible allocation xp is said to be an ex ante Walrasian allocation
(ex ante competitive equilibrium allocation) if there is a bounded mea-
surable price function p from (T, T ) to Rm+ \{0} such that for λ-almost
all i ∈ I, xp(i) is a maximal element in the budget set{
z ∈ L1(P T ,Rm+ ) :
∫
T
p(t) · z(t)dP T ≤
∫
T








under the expected utility function Upi (·).
7. A coalition A (i.e., a set in I with λ(A) > 0) is said to ex ante





e(i)dλ(i) for P T -almost all t ∈ T , and for λ-almost
all i ∈ A, Upi (ypi )) > Upi (xp(i)).14 A feasible allocation xp is said to be
in the ex ante core of Ep, or simply an ex ante core allocation in Ep,
if there is no coalition that ex ante blocks xp.
2.3.2 An earlier theorem
Theorem 2.3.1 Under assumptions A1 – A4, any ex ante efficient alloca-
tion is incentive compatible.
It is obvious that any ex ante core allocation is ex ante efficient. It is also
easy to check that any ex ante Walrasian allocation is ex ante efficient.
14One can also only define the allocation yp on A× T instead of I × T . However, there
is no loss of generality since one can always extend a function defined on A× T to I × T
to keep its integrability.
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2.4 Ex Ante Efficiency Implies Incentive Com-
patibility Under Cohort Independence
2.4.1 The generalized information structure
In this paper, we consider economies of a continuum of agents. Let I be
the set of all agents and {Aj}j∈J be a partition15 of I with each Aj being
finite. Endowed with I is an atomless probability space (I, I, λ)16, where I
is a σ−algebra on I and λ is a probability measure.
Let (T, T ) be a measurable space that models the private signal profiles
for all the agents, and therefore T is a space of functions from I to T 0. Thus,
t ∈ T , as a function from I to T 0, represents a private signal profile for all
agents in I. For a finite subset A of I, tA denotes the restriction of t to the
set A, while t−A is the restriction of t to the set I \ A; let TA = {tA : t ∈ T}
and T−A = {t−A : t ∈ T}. In compliance with the literature, we simply use
ti, t−i, Ti and T−i respectively when A = {i}. For simplicity, we shall assume
that (T, T ) has a product structure so that for each j ∈ J , T is a product of
T−Aj and TAj , while T is the product algebra of the σ-algebra TAj on TAj
and σ-algebra T−Aj on T−Aj . For t ∈ T and t′A ∈ TA, we shall adopt the
usual notation (t−A, t′A) to denote the signal profile whose value is t
′
A(i) for
agent i ∈ A, and the same as t for other agents.
15A collection {Xj : j ∈ J} of subsets of X is said to be a partition of X if (1) Xj is
nonempty for all j ∈ J ; (2) Xj ∩Xj′ = ∅ for any j 6= j′; and (3) X = ∪j∈JXj .
16Throughout this paper, we use the convention that all probability spaces are countably
additive.
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For s ∈ S and Aj, j ∈ J , let P TAjs and T T−Ajs be the marginal probability
measures of P Ts respectively on (TAj , TAj) and on (T−Aj , T−Aj). In particular,
we use the notation τis for P
Ti
s . We shall also impose the assumption that for
any qAj ∈ TAj , if P TAj (qAj) > 0, then P
TAj
s (qAj) > 0 for all s ∈ S. We then
assume that for i ∈ Aj, τi(ti) > 0, τi(t′i) > 0, for all tAj ∈ TAj with tAj(i) = ti,





Let F be the private signal process from I × T to T 0 such that F (i, t) =
ti for any (i, t) ∈ I × T . In this paper, we need to work with F that is
cohortly independent conditioned on the true states s ∈ S. However,
a similar technical difficulty as discussed in Sun (2006) arises, which is the
so-called measurability problem of independent processes. In our context, a
signal process that is essentially independent conditioned on the true states of
nature is never jointly measurable in the usual sense except for trivial cases.
Hence, we need to work with a joint agent-probability space (I×T, I£T , λ£
P Ts ) that extends the usual measure-theoretic product (I×T, I ⊗T , λ⊗P Ts )
of the agent space (I, I, λ) and the probability space (T, T , P Ts ), and retains




′) if i′ 6= i;
t′ if i′ = i
[tAj ]
t′
ti can be regarded as the reported signal profile on cohort Aj when agent i receives
a signal ti but reports t′.
The assumption requires the non-triviality of the reported signal, i.e., PTAj ([tAj ]
t′i
ti) > 0,
when ti, t′i and P
TAj (tAj ) are non-trivial.
This assumption will be used in the proof of Theorem 2.4.1. In order for equation
(2.4.13) to hold, we need equation (2.4.12) with [tAj ]
t′i









the Fubini property. Its formal definition is given in Definition 2.2.1.
We shall now follow the above Definition and notation. We consider
a large economy with asymmetric information. The space of agents is
the atomless probability space (I, I, λ). In this economy, agents i ∈ I are
informed with their private signals ti ∈ T 0 but not the true state, and
they can have contingent consumptions based on the signal profiles t ∈ T
announced by all the agents. Decisions are made at the ex ante level. The
common consumption set is the positive orthant Rm+ . In the sequel, we
shall state several assumptions on the economy.
A1. The utility function of each agent depends on her consumption x ∈
Rm+ and the true state s ∈ S but not on the private signals of the agents in
the economy. Thus, we can let u be a function from I ×Rm+ × S to R+ such
that for any given i ∈ I, u(i, x, s) is the utility of agent i at consumption
bundle x ∈ Rm+ and true state s ∈ S.
A2. For any given s ∈ S, u(i, x, s), (also denoted by us(i, x)),is I-
measurable in i ∈ I, continuous, strictly concave and monotonic in x ∈
Rm+ .
A3. Let e be a λ-integrable function from I to Rm+ with e(i) as the initial
endowment of agent i.
A4. The private signal process F is a measurable process from (I ×
T, I £ T ) to T 0 that is strongly cohortly conditionally independent,
given s˜ in the sense that for any j ∈ J , a cohort Aj’s signal F (Aj, ·)18 is
independent of all the events in the signal space (T−Aj , T−Aj), conditioned on
18F (Aj , ·) is a function defined on T . For any t ∈ T , F (Aj , t) = tAj .
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the true states of nature. In other words, for each s ∈ S, the probability space
(T, T , P Ts ) is the product of its marginal probability spaces (T−Aj , T−Aj , P
T−Aj
s )
and (TAj , TAj , P
TAj
s ).
The assumption A4 says that conditioned on the true states of nature,
the signals of a cohort have strictly no influence over any others. Thus,
perfect competition prevails in this economy in the sense that agents have
negligible initial endowments and negligible private information.
2.4.2 The main theorem
We are now ready to state the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 2.4.1 Under assumptions A1 – A4, any ex ante efficient alloca-
tion is incentive compatible.
2.4.3 Proof
Let xp be any ex ante efficient allocation. Then the Fubini property implies
that there is a set A∗ ∈ I with λ(A∗) = 1 such that for any i ∈ A∗ and any
s ∈ S, the integral ∫
T
xp(i, t)dP Ts is finite. We can define an allocation x¯
p by
letting x¯pi (·) = xpi (·) for i ∈ A∗ and x¯pi (·) ≡ ei for i /∈ A∗. Then, the integral∫
T
x¯p(i, t)dP Ts is finite for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S. It is obvious that x¯p is feasible
and ex ante efficient.
Define the following sets
∀s ∈ S, Ls = {t ∈ T : λF−1t = µs}; L0 = T − ∪s∈SLs.
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The non-triviality assumption implies that for any s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′,
Ls ∩ Ls′ = ∅. The measurability of the sets Ls, s ∈ S and L0 follows from
the measurability of F . Thus, the collection {L0} ∪ {Ls, s ∈ S} forms a
measurable partition of T .
By equation (2.3.1) and the Fubini property for (I × T, I £ T , λ £ P Ts ),
we have µs({q}) =
∫
I×T 1{q}(F (i, t))d(λ £ P Ts ) for any q ∈ T 0. Thus, µs is
actually the distribution (λ£ P Ts )F−1 of F , viewed as a random variable on
the product space I × T . Since the signal process F satisfies the condition
of conditional independence, it certainly satisfies the condition of essential
pairwise conditional independence, the exact law of large numbers in Lemma
2.2.1 implies that P Ts (Ls) = 1 for each s ∈ S.





e(i)dλ if t ∈ L0,∫
T
x¯p(i, t′)dP Ts (t
′) if t ∈ Ls, s ∈ S.
(2.4.1)
Since the Fubini property implies that
∫
T
x¯p(·, t)dP Ts (t) is I-measurable on
I, it is clear that yp is I ⊗ T -measurable and hence I £ T -measurable. For










s ∈ S and t ∈ Ls, yp(i, t) is
∫
T


















where the last identity follows from the feasibility of x¯p. Therefore, yp is a
feasible allocation in Ep that satisfies the feasibility condition for all t ∈ T .
We shall prove that x¯p(i, t) = yp(i, t) for λ£P T -almost all (i, t) ∈ I × T .
Suppose not; then there exist s0 ∈ S and coalition A ∈ I (with λ(A) > 0)
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such that for each i ∈ A, P Ts0 ({t ∈ T : x¯p(i, t) 6= yp(i, t)}) > 0, i.e., the ran-
dom variable x¯pi (·) is not essentially constant under the probability measure

















The assumption of monotonicity implies that for each i ∈ A, ui(0, s0) ≤
ui(x¯
p
























must have positive components. By the continuity
of the utility functions u(i, ·, s0), one can choose a coalition A0 ⊆ A (with
0 < λ(A0) < 1), a positive number ²0 and a vector e0 ∈ Rm+ with e0 6= 0 such































For each (i, t) ∈ I × T , let
zp(i, t) =

yp(i, t) for (i, t) ∈ I × (T \ Ls0),
yp(i, t)− e0 for (i, t) ∈ A0 × Ls0 ,
yp(i, t) + λ(A0)
1−λ(A0)e0 for (i, t) ∈ (I \ A0)× Ls0 .
(2.4.4)
It is obvious that zp is I £ T -measurable. When (i, t) ∈ A0 × Ls0 , zp(i, t) =





′) − e0 ≥ 0. It is thus clear that zp takes
values in Rm+ . The feasibility of yp for all t ∈ T implies immediately that for
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Therefore, zp is a feasible allocation.

























Hence, equations (2.4.1), (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) together with the fact that







































For any i /∈ A0, Jensen’s inequality together with the monotonicity of ui(·, s0),

















































Similarly, Jensen’s inequality together with equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.4) and






























Hence, we obtain from equations (2.4.6), (2.4.7) and (2.4.8) that for all i ∈ I,













s (t) with the strict inequality




























































This contradicts the ex ante efficiency of x¯p. Therefore, yp must agree with
x¯p except on a λ£ P T -null set.
Since xpi (·) = x¯pi (·) for i ∈ A∗ with λ(A∗) = 1, xp must agree with yp
except on a λ £ P T -null set. Hence, by the Fubini property, there is a I-
measurable subset A∗∗ of A∗ with λ(A∗∗) = 1 such that for any i ∈ A∗∗,
xpi (t) = y
p(t) for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
It remains to show that xp is incentive compatible. Fix any i ∈ A∗∗ and





s and pis > 0, we also have P
T
s (D
i) = 0. Since P Ts (Ls) = 1,
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we obtain that P Ts (D
i ∪ (T \ Ls)) = 0. Denote the set Di ∪ (T \ Ls) by Eis.
Let EistAj





s be the marginal probability measures of P Ts respec-
tively on (T−Aj , T−Aj) and (TAj , TAj). The conditional independence condi-
tion on F in Section 2.4.1 says that (T, T , P Ts ) is the product of (T−Aj , T−Aj , P
T−Aj
s )
and (TAj , TAj , P
TAj
s ).
For any fixed tAj , t
′
Aj
∈ TAj with P TAj (tAj) > 0 and P TAj (t′Aj) > 0, our as-





s (t′Aj) > 0. Since
P Ts (E















) = 0. Therefore, P
T−Aj
s (EistAj
∪Eist′Aj ) = 0.
For any fixed t−Aj /∈ EistAj∪E
is
t′Aj
, we have (t−Aj , tAj) /∈ Eis and (t−Aj , t′Aj) /∈
Eis, which means that (t−Aj , tAj) ∈ Ls \Di and (t−Aj , t′Aj) ∈ Ls \Di. Since
(t−Aj , tAj), (t−Aj , t
′
Aj
) /∈ Di, the property of the set Di implies that
xpi (t−Aj , tAj) = y
p
i (t−Aj , tAj), and x
p
i (t−Aj , t
′
Aj




Since (t−Aj , tAj), (t−Aj , t
′
Aj
) ∈ Ls, the definition of yp implies that
ypi (t−Aj , tAj) = y
p











p(i, t′′)dP Ts (t
′′) (since i also belongs to A∗). Hence,
for any t−Aj /∈ EistAj∪E
is
t′Aj
, equations (2.4.10) and (2.4.11) imply that xpi (t−Aj , tAj) =




The above identity and the fact that EistAj
∪Eist′Aj is a P
T−Aj
























′) if i′ 6= i;
q if i′ = i




























ti ∈ TAj , it is a signal profile restricted to cohort Aj. It is equal to tAj
for all agents in Aj except agent i whose signal is replaced by t
′
i.
By taking q to be ti or t
′
i in equation (2.4.13), equations (2.3.3) and
(2.4.12) then imply that Ui(x
p
i , ti|ti) = Ui(xpi , t′i|ti). Therefore, the condi-
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